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Abstract
Background: National Health Service (NHS) trusts, which provide the majority of hospital and community health
services to the English NHS, are increasingly adopting a ‘public firm’ model with a board consisting of executive
directors who are trust employees and external non-executives chosen for their experience in a range of areas such
as finance, health care and management. In this paper we compare the non-executive directors’ roles and interests
in, and contributions to, NHS trust boards’ governance activities with those of executive directors; and examine
non-executive directors’ approach to their role in board meetings.
Methods: Non-participant observations of three successive trust board meetings in eight NHS trusts (primary care
trusts, foundation trusts and self-governing (non-foundation) trusts) in England in 2008–9. The observational data
were analysed inductively to yield categories of behaviour reflecting the perlocutionary types of intervention which
non-executive directors made in trust meetings.
Results: The observational data revealed six main perlocutionary types of questioning tactic used by non-executive
directors to executive directors: supportive; lesson-seeking; diagnostic; options assessment; strategy seeking; and
requesting further work. Non-executive board members’ behaviours in holding the executive team to account at
board meetings were variable. Non-executive directors were likely to contribute to finance-related discussions
which suggests that they did see financial challenge as a key component of their role.
Conclusions: The pattern of behaviours was more indicative of an active, strategic approach to governance than of
passive monitoring or ‘rubber-stamping’. Nevertheless, additional means of maintaining public accountability of
NHS trusts may also be required.
Keywords: Corporate governance, Clinical governance, Non-executive directors, Interaction between directors,
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Background
As the state in many European countries is minimised in
favour of the provision of publicly-funded services, if not
by private providers then by ‘public firms’ modelled
upon them, the question of how to maintain the public
accountability of these services becomes more pressing.
This paper examines how board members of English
National Health Service (NHS) organisations during
2008–9 behaved in that role.
Boards and governance
Boards of directors are intended, both in healthcare and
in other sectors, to exercise corporate governance over
public and private corporations [1]. Researchers have
tended to apply principal-agent theory when analysing
corporate boards’ relationship to managers and so, indir-
ectly, to workers [2, 3]. That theory predicts a potential
‘principal-agent problem’ i.e., the risk that managers will
manage their organisation self-interestedly rather than in
the interests of those whom the board represents [4] or,
doubting the legitimacy of the board’s authority, infor-
mally resist the board [5]; all of which is taken to imply
the need for means to align artificially the executive
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directors’ normative beliefs and interests with those of
the non-executive directors who represent the non-
managerial stakeholders in the board. In corporate
boards the latter are predominantly financial interests
(shareholders, investors); in public organisations’ boards,
the state’s interests; and in third sector organisations’
boards either the general public or more ‘diverse’, specific
stakeholders’ interests [6, 7]. For corporations, therefore,
one means for pre-empting this anticipated ‘principal-
agent’ problem has been to pay top managers partly in
shares or share options [8, 9]. However this method may
have the perverse effect of incentivising managers to focus
their efforts on raising share prices in the short-term. It is
anyway irrelevant to non-corporate settings, where other
means are required for aligning managers’ interests with
those of the ‘stakeholders’ whom the board represents.
These means include:
1. A transactional approach: the board and managers
negotiate a modus vivendi which appeals to the
intrinsic, not only the financial, motivations of either
party [5].
2. Purposive selection of board members, both
individually and in terms of the mix of members in
the board as a whole.
3. Educating and training non-executive board
members in the behaviours required to control
their organisation’s strategic direction and
outcomes [10], exercising this influence vicariously
through the executive directors and other
managers. That behaviour includes questioning,
challenging and supporting the executive directors [11],
4. Board scrutiny of the work of executive directors
(EDs), other managers and staff [12].
The third and fourth rely upon what topics the non-
executive directors (NEDs) take an interest in, who they
consult about them, and what contributions the NEDs
make to the board’s work both within and outside of the
confines of board meetings [13].
Empirical studies – which are mostly of US organisa-
tions - present a mixed picture of how far these methods
work as intended. Board composition and credibility ap-
pears to influence the organisation’s ability to obtain re-
sources externally, particularly when the organisation is
contractually accountable to public bodies which commis-
sion (sub-contract) it [14]. A cohesive board, and one
whose members participate in board educational activities,
appears to help its organisation function efficiently, a dis-
cordant board the opposite [15]. Three antecedents of
board task performance are diversity of board member-
ship, commitment (‘stewardship’ [16]) and critical debate
[2]. Against this, in 2008 a UK Government report on cor-
porate banking failures found that the essential ‘challenge’
step in board decision-making processes was often miss-
ing, and that the role of NEDs should be more than a ‘rub-
ber-stamping’ exercise, with the appointment of NEDs
who are prepared to focus on high level risk issues [16].
Although their boards do occupy themselves mainly with
financial oversight and policy making, many US non-
profit organisations display a ‘board gap … the difference
between board performance and the expectation of
boards’ [14]. Having a chief executive as a voting board
member tended if anything to reduce board accountability
[17]. NEDs on UK corporate boards most strongly pro-
mote board accountability when they are ‘engaged but
non-executive’, ‘challenging but supportive’ of managers
and ‘independent but involved’ [11]. In summary, the be-
haviours through which board members make managers
and workers accountable appear to fall within three main
approaches:
1. selecting topics of interest for scrutiny and
discussion at board meetings, but this is done mostly
outside board meetings and by the board chair and
secretary (or the equivalents).
2. Initiating strategies to influence the organisation’s
future work, not just responding passively to the
executives’ proposals.
3. attributing responsibility to specific executives for
specific activities.
All three strategies have implications for who the non-
executives consult, and about what topics, both inside
and outside board meetings.
These behaviours are accomplished through speech acts:
the use of speech for practical purposes. As our analytic
framework we therefore adopted Austin’s account of the
three main elements of speech acts: locution (cognitive
content); illocution (the kind of act performed by the
speech act); and perlocution (the behavioural, practical re-
sponse which the speaker is trying to produce) [18]. We
used Austin’s theory because it is a form of discourse ana-
lysis that links the content of a speech act (in this case,
what board members said; what Austin calls the ‘locution’
of a speech act) with its intended effects on others’ behav-
iour (its ‘perlocution’) both in its immediate setting (i.e.,
board meetings) and beyond (i.e., in the rest of the organ-
isation). In this respect Austin’s approach contrasts with,
say, cognitive frame [19], Leximancer [20] and logic [21]
analysis methods of discourse analysis. For this study, the
perlocutionary effects of directors’ behaviour were
most relevant because we were interested in how board
members’ behaviour within board meetings acts – or
fails to – as a mechanism for exercising governance by
means of persuading, negotiating with [5] or in some
other way directing the executive directors present at a
board meeting to take certain prescribed actions
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afterwards outside the meeting, in the rest of the
organisation.
Trusts and boards in the English NHS
General practice apart, NHS organisations are mostly
structured as ‘trusts’, of which three main varieties
existed at the time of this research (2008–9). Primary
care trusts (PCTs) were responsible for coordinating
general practices and for commissioning (purchasing)
secondary care, community and mental health services.
NHS trusts (with no qualifying adjective) were the usual
form of organisation for acute hospitals, mental health
services and, increasingly, community health services.
Foundation trusts (FTs), described below and also
known as Self-Governing Trusts (SGT), were another
form of provider organisation. Governance over all three
types of trust was exercised by a board of executive and
non-executive members [22]. Across all NHS Boards,
42.4 % of members were NEDs in 2010 [23].
NHS trusts were set up at the start of the 1990s. Their
boards of directors consist of EDs who are employees of
the organisation and hold senior positions in the Trusts,
and NEDs who are not directly employed, but are
appointed to sit on boards because of their expertise in
areas such as finance, management and clinical matters
[24–27]. NEDs are expected to challenge and clarify items
with EDs in order to provide governance and stewardship
within the organisation [28]. NHS boards of directors are
held accountable to higher NHS bodies, at the time of this
research strategic health authorities (SHAs), for their ac-
tions. They have to produce annual reports and audited
accounts and hold an annual general meeting [29].
Similar structures were created in PCTs. To advise its
board each PCT had a professional executive committee
of general practitioners (GPs). Initially PCTs line-managed
primary care services other than those provided by general
practices, but from 2004 these services were transferred to
separate organisations commissioned by the PCTs, mostly
NHS trusts but occasionally social enterprises. At the time
of this research PCTs both commissioned this range of
services and, in some places, still directly managed a
residuum of community health services. Meantime
policy-makers were pressing NHS Trusts to convert into
Foundation Trusts (FTs). Created in 2006, this new class
of trust was set up to increase local accountability with
more freedom to invest and disinvest [30]. FTs are re-
sponsible to Monitor, an NHS regulatory authority, for
their performance and market behaviour. In addition
their boards of directors are responsible to a board of
governors, selected from the public served by that
organisation.
Apparently NHS boards too display a ‘board gap’ at
times. Ferlie et al. [22] found that English NHS boards
tended to endorse managers’ decisions rather than make
their own, although NHS boards have been re-structured
and re-populated several times since then. A commission-
ing board for mental health services was found to serve
not so much a decision-making function as being a place
of ritual ‘where participants tell narratives about who they
are collectively, sustain culture, organize shared emotions,
and conciliate over social relations in conflicts … to main-
tain organizational cohesion above all’ [31]. A review of
governance arrangements in NHS FTs indicated that the
additional structures in place, allowing patient, public and
staff input, needed further development to demonstrate
value [32].
Study aims and research questions
These findings therefore raise the questions of whether
NHS board NEDs do indeed steer, even initiate, their or-
ganisation’s strategy, monitor its activity and so behave in
board meetings as to enable the boards to exercise control
and scrutiny over the organisations whose governance
they are responsible for. In this study we therefore aimed
to explore further how the role of NEDs in NHS boards
differs from that of EDs, how the two kinds of director
interact in the boards, and what the implications for the
governance of NHS organisations might be. Our research
questions (RQs) were:
1. What practical responses were NEDs trying to elicit,
at board meetings, from the NEDs and how did
NEDs contribute to the meetings?
2. What governance strategies do the above patterns of
behaviour appear to represent?
3. Which topics were NEDs (and EDs) most interested
in?
There are few other studies of NHS board roles, inter-
ests and relationships. This study therefore adds to the
evidence about the governance and processes of stew-
ardship in NHS board of directors and interaction be-
tween those in executive and non-executive roles. So far
as the NHS is concerned, the Francis enquiry [33] ex-
posed the weighty consequences of failing to ensure the
public accountability of healthcare providers. As health-
care reforms, both in England and other countries make
even publicly-owned healthcare providers increasingly
autonomous, these questions have increasing and wider
importance.
Methods
Research design
We combined a structured observation of board meet-
ings and a cross-sectional sample survey of board mem-
bers. This paper concentrates on the former. (Details of
the survey are available on request from the authors.)
We observed the meetings for each of eight boards,
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categorising the behaviours that we saw board members
use by applying categories which we had developed from
those used in existing empirical studies [31, 34] and
from the theory of speech acts. In applying these cat-
egories, and refining them by doing so, we formed some
initial conclusions about board members’ modes of be-
haviour, the topics of board discussion, and which board
members tended to take the lead on particular topics.
Sample and settings
A mix of PCTs, acute FTs and acute SGTs were included
in both parts of the study. We selected a sample of eight
English NHS trust boards for observation, in order to
collect data suitable for qualitative analysis. This was a
theoretically-based selection. We assumed that boards
with different functions within the NHS might discuss
different topics, and that relationships between ED and
non-ED members, and the ways in which meetings were
conducted, might correspondingly differ. Of the eight
boards, four (PCTs) were predominantly commissioners,
and four providers of care. (The latter were acute care
trusts, two of them SGTs and two FTs.) We were able to
observe both the open (part 1) and private (part 2) part
of the board meetings in five organisations. In the
remaining three trusts, part 1 only was observed; two
provider trusts refused access to part 2 and one commis-
sioning trust had not decided by the time the study
ended. Table 1 characterises the eight trusts whose
board meetings we observed.
All types of trust were undergoing transition at the
time of the study (2008–9). PCTs had recently under-
gone mergers and become essentially commissioning or-
ganisations, not providers. The SGTs were considering
applying to become FTs, and the FTs were still in the
early stages of adjusting to their new status and of being
accountable to both a board of directors and a board of
governors. We used a survey (not reported here) to as-
sess whether findings from the sites described in Table 1
were likely to have external validity, which they were. In
brief, the ratio of EDs to NEDs in the observational
sample was similar to the ratio among all NHS Board
members [23].
Data collection
Three consecutive meetings were observed in each of
the eight NHS trust boards i.e., 24 observations totalling
over 80 h. Methods of designing the observation, to in-
clude construction of the observation schedule, have
been previously reported [34]. Briefly, the observation
schedule recorded the ‘presenting problem’ (taken to in-
clude any practical proposals or action points) and who
raised it. Besides directors’ behaviours, we recorded the
main points of the debate, who responded, and how, to
the ‘presenting problem’ raised by a NED, and what de-
cision the board finally made. There were also sections
for other qualitative observational notes and quotations.
The schedule and its coding sheet were pilot tested for re-
liability before use. From publicly available biographical
information on NHS trust websites we also ascertained
the occupational background of the board members we
observed.
Analyses
We analysed the observational data inductively. We clas-
sified directors’ behaviour according to the perlocution
[35] of their questions and statements in board meet-
ings, i.e., in terms of what type of practical response that
the speaker (NED) was apparently trying to elicit from
the board members who were being addressed (e.g., get-
ting an ED to agree to alter a proposed course of action).
We took this approach because a perlocutionary cat-
egorisation tells us:
1. the range of practices (e.g., option assessment,
seeking information etc.) through which NEDs tried
to influence EDs’ managerial work; and
2. which behaviours within this repertiore NEDs most
heavily relied upon at Board meetings
Also a perlocutionary classification offers a framework
for:
Table 1 Characteristics of trusts whose board meetings were observed
Dominant Role Site Characteristics Part 2 observed [Y/N]
Commissioner PCT 1 Inner-city, deprived area, high ethnic minority population N
PCT 2 Rural area serving a large area and population Y
PCT 3 Mixed rural and urban, largely affluent area Y
PCT 4 Inner city, deprived area, high ethnic minority population Y
Provider SGT 1 Large teaching hospital, city setting N
SGT 2 Teaching hospital, mixed urban and rural setting N
FT 1 District general hospital, largely rural population Y
FT 2 District general hospital in small city, mixed urban and rural population Y
PCT primary care trust, SGT self-governing acute trust, FT acute foundation trust
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3. systematically comparing how NEDs’ use of these
behaviours varied between different organisational
types; and
4. imputing what the NEDs assumed were legitimate
practical demands to make of the EDs; hence
describe what, at minimum, NEDs thought their
role involved.
A perlocutionary classification captures the practical
content (locution) of a speech act, in this case what the
EDs were being asked to do. It tells us how, within
Board meetings, NEDs exercised their role through
speech acts. It does not necessarily capture NEDs’ tone
of voice, attitudes, whether an NED was trying to per-
suade, intimidate, cajole etc., nor impute to the speaker
any implicit, unspoken perlocution behind the overtly
stated one. Insofar as they reflected hidden interpersonal
agendas, We observed whether those being addressed
appeared to understand, and whether they appeared to
comply or made counter-responses.
Two researchers categorised the directors’ behaviours
from field notes made during the 24 periods of non-
participant observation of board meetings, devising new
categories until saturation (no more appeared necessary
for classifying the data), then de-duplicating this initial
set of categories to yield an irreducible set of six. Each
category was defined, and differentiated, in terms of
what practical response the director appeared to be seek-
ing from the board and managers, i.e., to:
1. encourage existing activities and decisions
(‘supportive’ behaviour).
2. suggest practical steps to prevent the recurrence of
past problems (‘drawing [practical] lessons’).
3. analyse what had caused such problems or,
conversely, successes (‘diagnostic’ behaviour):
4. evaluate which strategy was preferable (‘option
assessment’)
5. elicit suggestions about how to develop the
organisation’s future work (‘strategy-seeking’)
6. initiate the production of information about the
organisation’s current or recent activities (‘seeking
fuller reports’).
Items (3) and (6) respectively concerned explanations
and factual information about the current and recent
past activity. Items (2) and (5) elicited proposals for ac-
tion (responding to past events and shaping the organi-
sation’s future activity), and items (1) and (4) elicited
normative judgements (respectively about the present
and future). The empirical distribution of behaviours
across these categories therefore reveals whether direc-
tors attended more in practice to retrospective (e.g.,
monitoring) or prospective (e.g., strategy) issues, and
more to descriptive, analytic (e.g., diagnostic) or norma-
tive (e.g., legitimating past or choosing future activity)
questions.
Some utterances might be interpreted as having
more than one of the perlocutions listed above (e.g., an
ostensibly supportive comment such as ‘How have the
Outpatient clinics coped with the increase in activity?’
might also be a veiled request to diagnose the trust’s
current activity to assess whether the increase was sus-
tainable). In such cases we coded each utterance ac-
cording to what the researchers agreed appeared to be
its primary perlocution, given its context and the prac-
tical implications that those at the board meeting took
to follow from it. By ignoring what might be called sec-
ondary perlocutions, this approach tended to under-
record the number of perlocutionary acts occurring in
board meetings, so in that sense be incomplete.
What would it mean for a Board, even an organisation,
if its NEDs tended especially to use certain of these perlo-
cutions rather than others? Above we noted that, agenda-
setting apart, the two main approaches by which NEDs
might influence other Board members and through them
the rest of their organisation were:
1. proposing strategies for their organisation’s future
work; and
2. holding EDs and other staff to account for its
current and past work.
To see NEDs relying heavily on seeking practical lessons,
option assessment and strategy-seeking would suggest a
predilection for the first of these. To see them rely heavily
on diagnosis of past failures or successes, seeking further
reports and, if applicable, supportive behaviour would sug-
gest they preferred the second approach, emphasising the
monitoring of what their organisation did. Passive, ‘rubber-
stamping’ NEDs would themselves make little use of diag-
nostic behaviour and option-appraisal but they, and NEDs
who wished to avoid discord, would make much use of sup-
portive behaviours. NEDs who focused on risky strategic
decisions would rely most upon diagnostic behaviour,
lesson-seeking and option appraisal. In short, different se-
lections of perlocutions would constitute different strategies
by which NEDs exercised governance through their Board,
with correspondingly different balances of emphasis on re-
cent, current or future activity. Insofar as NEDs’ influence
extended beyond the Board, one would expect the wider
management style of the organisation then to display simi-
lar patterns.
Research ethics and governance
The NHS Research Ethics Service (reference number 08/
H0104/5) and the Plymouth University Faculty of Health
Research Ethics Committee granted approval; approval
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was also gained from individual trust research and devel-
opment officers under the NHS research governance
framework. We obtained written consent for the obser-
vations from members of NHS Trusts. As a condition
of ethical approval, informants and study sites are
pseudonymised.
Results
The observational analysis suggested that NEDs used six
main types of questioning tactic. Table 2 gives examples.
Supportive comments (see Table 2) acknowledged - in
one case to the extent of being congratulatory, and in
others by means of leading questions – that the organ-
isation was functioning as the board desired (e.g., I am
impressed with this report and the extent of working with
partners.), endorsing them, encouraging them to con-
tinue and re-asserting that board decisions, or the ac-
tions taken to implement them, had been sound.
Lesson-seeking consisted of assertions or questions
about the underlying reasons for the kinds of events that
might be the subject of the supportive comments (e.g.,
do we know why CDiff [Clostridium Difficile infection]
rates have improved so much?). Diagnostic comments
and questions (e.g., ‘Why are we focusing on hips and
knees?’) were used to explain or question why apparent
problems, failures or unforeseen events had occurred,
and so challenge EDs to account for their decisions.
NEDs used strategy-seeking questions to challenge EDs
to explain and substantiate how they would achieve ob-
jectives set by, or externally imposed on, the board (e.g.,
How will you get up to target?). The focus or content of
strategy seeking questions therefore depended on the
type of trust. NEDs’ strategy-seeking questions (e.g.,
What is the average length of stay for all patients?) were
typically seeking to discover:
1. how patient pathways were working or might be
expected to change if the board took a particular
decision,
2. the extent of compliance with standards of care,
3. the cost implications of clinical practices.
Unlike supportive comments or questions, strategy
seeking questions challenged EDs to justify their asser-
tions or decisions. Requests for further reports (e.g., Can
you examine why we have an increase in DNAs [patients
who missed outpatient appointments]?) usually sup-
ported the board’s scrutiny role. Their content reflected
the type of trust. NEDs on PCT boards were more likely
to ask questions about the PCT’s commissioning activ-
ities whereas NEDs for the provider trusts were more fo-
cused on clinical outcomes. Categories (1) to (6) each
related a director’s behaviour to a local context, although
what that context was, hence the substance of each
Table 2 Types of NED perlocution observed in board meetings
Type 1 Supportive
I am impressed with this report and the extent of working with partners.
(Site D, PCT).
Are you happy with the 4 h target? [Board setting criteria for pilot work
in the new Minor Injuries Unit] (Site A, PCT).
How are the problems with the NHS IT system affecting the staff at
grass-roots level? (Site E, FT).
Are you content with the length of time between an incident and the
report; is it good enough? (Site F, FT).
Type 2 Lesson-seeking
How have we managed to reduce both long term and short-term sick-
ness? (Site H, SGT).
Do we know why our C. Diff rates have improved so much? (Site E, FT)
The success of the sexual health model is to be applauded; is there a
model here that we can also use for immunisation? (Site C, PCT).
Type 3 Diagnostic
Why are we not achieving targets for out of hours diabetes services; is
the target unrealistic? (Site B, PCT).
Why is COPD not included in the top ten [World Class Commissioning]
priorities? (Site D, PCT).
It says here that we’re running at 148 % capacity: how? (Site G, SGT).
Why are almost 50 % patients waiting more than 31 days? (Site A, PCT)
Why are we focusing on hips and knees [in reducing waiting lists]?
(Site E, FT).
Communication [with patients whose appointments were cancelled] is
a weak area and needs improving. (Site G, SGT)
Type 4 Option Assessment
Will the new informatics strategy improve co-ordination of diabetes
management? (Site B, PCT).
What are the complaints about? We’re far more interested in the nature
of the complaints; we need more detail on this rather than the process
to resolve them. (Trust G, SGT).
What are the additional costs for pre-op screening of all patients [for
MRSA]? (Site H, SGT).
The risks and staffing are quite different for home and hospital births;
are the tariffs [i.e., payments to the hospital] different? (Site E, FT).
Type 5 Seeking Strategy
How will we know that changes [resulting from a Health Care
Commission report on one of the provider trusts] are being sustained?
(Site B, PCT)
Who are we consulting with [about regionalisation of stroke and
trauma services]? (Site C, PCT).
How will we review this [Health Care Commission] rating during the
year to ensure we’re not in the same situation again? (Site F, FT).
How can we take this [problem with inpatient and outpatient waiting
times] forward in relation to our Foundation Trust application?
(Site H, SGT).
When will we see improvement in the privacy and dignity performance
indicators? (Trust D, PCT).
Type 6 Requesting Fuller Reports
We can’t see what the targets are and what the current baseline is; this
needs different presentation. (Site A, PCT).
Can you please provide a separate report on orthopaedics each time
and add it to the exception reporting. (Site F, FT).
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suggestion, demand etc., obviously depended on each or-
ganisation’s particular circumstances at the time and the
meeting agenda.
In the observed meetings, drawing lessons was NEDs’
least frequent intervention, strategy-seeking the most
frequent NED contribution to board meetings (Table 3).
Table 3 shows that NEDs’ behaviour was on balance
more suggestive of the approach of exercising govern-
ance by proposing strategies for their organisation’s fu-
ture work than that of attributing responsibilities to
executives for its current and past work. The former
(option appraisal, strategy-seeking) accounted for half of
the NEDs’ interventions. The general qualitative pattern
was that NEDs saw their roles in meetings as being to
interrogate what the organisation’s managers (including
the EDs, but not only they) were doing, to make feed-
back about organisational (but not usually personal) per-
formance, and to select the main directions for future
activity. EDs saw their roles in meetings partly as
responding to the feedback and requests for practical
proposals, also as helping to frame the range of strat-
egies and feedback issues that NEDs would interrogate.
However, we observed variations in this general pattern.
Some NEDs contributed little to meetings and asked few
questions, whilst others frequently asked questions and
asked EDs to explain further or undertake further work
in a variety of areas. In particular the extent of discus-
sion of clinical matters depended on the ways in which
NEDs questioned EDs. The lengths of meetings varied
considerably (45 min to 5 h, mean 3 h 20 min) and were
generally longer where NEDs used a variety of question-
ing tactics that generated discussion and debate. The
level of debate and discussion in board meetings varied
according to the questioning tactics and willingness of
the NEDs to question EDs and Chief Executives.
We observed three dimensions to this dynamic. One
was how the NED role was set up at organisational level,
for example what part the NEDs played in governance
structures outside the Board itself. NEDs’ ability and
freedom to question the EDs appeared to depend on
what further roles, besides board membership, the NED
had in the organisational structure and upon the NED’s
personal ability and willingness to question EDs. NEDs’
precise roles varied across trusts. Thirty-four of the 135
NEDs identified further roles that they held. Nineteen
were chair and eight vice chair of the board, and seven
were chair of the audit committee. Most were chairing
committees, for example the clinical governance com-
mittee or audit committee, depending on their skills. At
one trust NEDs regularly visited wards and other clinical
areas and had a regular agenda slot to feed back what
they found. Whilst we limited our observations to the
board meetings, it was evident, and not surprising, that
NEDs with these additional roles played a more active
role in discussions related to their governance role.
Nevertheless these NEDs still retained a ‘non-executive’
attitude in these discussions in that they did not become
defensive of Trust actions in their discussions at the
board. There was no obvious relationship between the
extent and type of board meeting contribution and the
occupational background of the NED. Neither did the
length of time served on the board (or, in the case of
newly merged trusts, predecessor bodies) appear to in-
fluence the contribution made by individual NEDs.
Second, NEDs’ interests in particular areas of ques-
tioning tended to wax and wane depending on the con-
text in which they were discussed. For example a patient
complaint could suddenly evoke high levels of interest if
it reflected poorly on the organisation. Similarly, if there
were a staffing crisis affecting care-giving or achieve-
ment of targets, interest in human resources moved up
the scale. Clinical ethics and governance attracted more
interest if there was an ethical dilemma (such as balan-
cing the costs and efficacy of medications) or issue with
the implementation of evidence-based practice. Also the
agenda usually constrained what NEDs would ask about.
Third, we observed variations in how actively or pas-
sively EDs responded to NED requests, questions and
comments. At one pole, ED responses were passively
compliant, for instance in minuting the NED’s request
(e.g., to amend board minutes to record difficulties as
well as successes in meeting control of infection targets)
Table 3 Types and numbers (percentage) of Non-Executive Director intervention observed during board meetings
PCT FT SGT ALL
A B C D E F G H
Supportive comments 5(11 %) 0(0 %) 0(0 %) 6(25 %) 7(16 %) 1(4 %) 3(8 %) 1(3 %) 23(9 %)
Lessons learnt 2(4 %) 0(0 %) 3(9 %) 1(3 %) 3(7 %) 0(0 %) 0(0 %) 2(6 %) 11(4 %)
Contextual comments, Questions 8(18 %) 7(27 %) 3(9 %) 4(17 %) 10(23 %) 5(20 %) 7(18 %) 6(18 %) 50(19 %)
Option assessment 14(32 %) 8(31 %) 7(23 %) 5(21 %) 15(36 %) 8(32 %) 7(18 %) 9(27 %) 73(27 %)
Strategy seeking 11(24 %) 7(27 %) 10(31 %) 4(17 %) 7(16 %) 10(40 %) 9(24 %) 4(12 %) 62(23 %)
Requesting further work 5(11 %) 4(15 %) 9(28 %) 4(17 %) 1(2 %) 1(4 %) 12(32 %) 11(34 %) 47(18 %)
TOTALS (100 %) 45 26 32 24 43 25 38 33 266
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or in agreeing with what the NED had said (e.g., about
the financial situation, staff morale). More actively, EDs
agreed to chase up promised actions which had not
taken place or bring the matter forward to a subsequent
board meeting. In a few cases, EDs provided then and
there missing information whose absence an NED had
pointed out. EDs also undertook to hold further discus-
sions outside the board meeting (e.g., to correct alleged
inaccuracies in reports about capital grants) and to guar-
antee NED involvement in board sub-committees (e.g.,
for audit, remuneration). This was the nearest that EDs
came to making counter-responses to what the NEDs
said. We did not observe any occasion on which an ED
overtly challenged the NED’s intervention or showed any
outward sign of non-compliance. NEDs were prepared
to press EDs to substantiate what the EDs were stating
or proposing, and sometimes insisted on being kept in-
formed of (even involved in) work directly arising from
Board decisions. We observed no occasions on which
NEDs simply over-ruled the EDs.
The main substantive foci of board discussion were
the overall performance and competence of the manage-
ment of the trust (‘corporate governance’), the manage-
ment of clinical quality (‘clinical governance’) and
finance. In the SGTs, which were preparing their appli-
cations for FT status, NEDs were more likely to request
further reports in the Part 1 (public) meetings. Much of
the discussion in the private part of PCT board meetings
related to their dual role at that time of commissioner
and provider and, in particular, to the purpose of NED
participation in managerial sub-committees. There was
also considerable discussion of the NEDs’ role during
the Part 2 (i.e., private) component of board meetings:
The non-executive directors are being used in too
operational a manner; the NED role should be to
challenge the executive directors (NED, PCT 1).
We need maximum engagement between the
Non-Executive Directors and the Executive Directors
(Chair, PCT 4)
We need to ensure that the Non-Executive Directors are
kept in the loop [regarding media interest in a serious
untoward incident] (Chief Executive Officer, FT 2)
The NED should ensure that appropriate advice has
been taken (Chair, PCT 1)
NEDs’ ability, willingness and freedom to question
EDs and hold them to account appeared to vary across
organisations, depending on both NEDs’ personal char-
acteristics and the manner in which the role was estab-
lished by the chair.
We also observed that EDs intervened more often to
discuss concrete, practical aspects of service provision:
service design, evidence base for practice and referral
rates and volumes, i.e., what might be described as the
more technical aspects of management, both financial
and ‘real side’ (e.g., activity rates), than NEDs. NED in-
terventions gave weight to broader service outcomes
such as patient feedback and complaints, relationships
with stakeholders, clinical ethics and clinical outcomes.
Otherwise NED and ED patterns of intervention did not
appear to differ much. Taken together, NEDS and EDs
showed more interest in retrospective (outcome moni-
toring) and diagnostic issues than NHS policy agendas,
although service design was often discussed. EDs were
more likely to contribute about topics that were subject
to national performance targets, especially those which
combined clinical and policy issues, for example, service
design and standards. These topics have potential impli-
cations for risk management (hence managers’ account-
ability or hospital liability), but for other target-driven
topics - clinical outcomes, referral rates and activity
levels - EDs and NEDs equally contributed to board dis-
cussions and decisions. We observed that NEDs did
nevertheless contribute actively to finance-related discus-
sions. This suggests that NEDs saw financial questioning
as a key component of their role (regardless of whether
they were personally interested in the subject [34]).
Discussion and conclusions
Qualifications to findings
Certain clear patterns and contrasts in ED and NED be-
haviour became evident from the interactions observed
across the 80 h of board meetings. The observations
suggest what directors’ role was in practice, irrespective
of directors’ attitudes or normative beliefs about what
their role ought to be. One might impute the latter from
their speech acts, but such questions are better
researched by depth-interviews. Conceivably NEDs’ as-
sumptions and attitudes on these points might in turn
partly reflect the wider NHS policy and institutional
contexts. These matters merit further research. The ad-
junctive survey suggested that the pattern of interaction
observed across the 80 h of board meetings has wider,
external validity. We did not study what practical conse-
quences for the rest of the study organisations, in particu-
lar for their organisational behaviour and transparency
(accountability), resulted from NED activities at Board
meetings. A perlocutionary classification of NEDs’ verbal
behaviours in Board meetings cannot accomplish that,
and did not aim to. For that would require another sub-
stantial implementation study, looking within rather than
across organisations, and investigating how far the ap-
proaches to governance (e.g., strategy-setting versus moni-
toring versus rubber-stamping) represented by NEDs’
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perlocutionary behaviour within Board meetings were
carried through into managerial practice and styles
outside Board meetings, and to what effect. The rela-
tionships between board characteristics and an organi-
sation’s performance are mediated through many
complex factors - workforce characteristics, organisa-
tional structure and external resource dependencies, to
name but three.
NHS organisations from other UK countries were not
included due to their differing nature following devolution
of power for the NHS and thus differing NHS structures.
Since this research was undertaken the English NHS has
been ‘reformed’ yet again. However the governing bodies
of Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs), which in 2013
replaced PCTs, are still required to include ‘independent
lay members’ and comply with similar ‘Principles of Good
Governance’ [36] as apply to NHS Foundation Trusts,
which continue as before. NHS trust boards remain struc-
tured, populated and centrally accountable (now to NHS
England rather than SHAs), essentially as described above.
Our findings remain relevant to the present-day NHS, in-
deed are likely to become increasingly so as NHS trusts
are encouraged to become more like ‘public firms’.
Empirical findings
In summary, NEDs used six main perlocutionary types
of intervention in board meetings: supportive comment;
lesson-seeking; diagnostic questions or comment; option
assessment; strategy-seeking; and seeking further work.
They relied most on strategy-seeking and least on lesson-
seeking. In Board meetings they were active in financial
monitoring. EDs’ interventions tended to concentrate on
detailed operational questions (referral rates, service de-
sign, evidence-based practice). Our findings suggest that
NEDs did intervene to scrutinise and control the main ac-
tivities for which their organisations were responsible, foci
which varied between boards, reflecting current policy pri-
orities and their organisations’ role within the NHS. NEDs
showed greatest interest in the topics of patient experience
(clinical and non-clinical), with the exception of evidence-
based practice, and least in the more purely managerial
topics. Non-executive members of NHS boards took inter-
est in what policy makers regarded as the most important
policy and managerial issues, in a way that reflected their
organisation’s role in the wider health economy and their
own role in governance activities outside board meetings.
We found no evidence of NEDs straying into an executive
role. The pattern of NED behaviours was on balance more
indicative of an active, strategic approach to governance
than of passive monitoring or ‘rubber-stamping’.
These findings are informative in four ways. First,
many NEDs in the US third sector regard their role as
more honorific than practical [37]. The NHS NEDs that
we studied were more active and assertive than that.
Second, NEDs in certain British corporations have been
criticised for insufficiently challenging managers [38].
We have reported examples, in the NHS boards we ob-
served, of NEDs sometimes challenging, albeit in mea-
sured ways, what managers were saying. However events
such as the avoidable patient deaths and poor treatment
at Mid-Staffordshire General Hospital [33] show that the
NHS has no grounds for complacency on this score.
Third, NEDs’ reliance on EDs to propose directions for
future activity is a pattern that has withstood several
NHS ‘reforms’, including policies intended to strengthen
NEDs’ role. Last, Austin’s analytic categories can inform-
atively be applied to the analysis of board meetings.
However this study also highlights ways in which Austin’s
analytical framework requires further development for
that purpose, among them ways of bringing illocution
(speech acts’ attitudinal, emotional and motivational ex-
pressiveness and effects) into the analysis of meetings; and
a fuller explanation of how illocution mediates and/or
moderates the relationships between locution and per-
locution. The present study has applied a principal-agent
model of governance but another future research question
is how an Austinian framework might also be used in a
more transactional analysis of how the boards of ‘public
firms’ (not only government departments [5]) exercise
governance.
Differences in the stakeholders which the different types
of board represent, and in the different organisations’
functions within (say) a health system, imply different cri-
teria of ‘efficient’ organisational, and in particular Board,
performance [32]. We have also found that assumptions
about boards and director’s roles drawn from other coun-
tries and sectors do not always apply to NHS boards; a
finding relevant to the assumption, in current UK health
policy, that public bodies should preferably imitate private
corporations. NEDs of different kinds of organisation may
therefore require correspondingly different knowledge and
skills and if so, different recruitment criteria. Finally, it
may also be necessary to supplement the use of a board
including NEDs with other means of maintaining the pub-
lic accountability of health system providers.
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